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Introduction

Teacher appealed the suspension of his license, arguing that the Board
failed to follow this court's two-part fairness test and also made it impossible for
that test to be followed. The Board's response brief confirms Teacher's
arguments.
The Board argues that the fairness test does not apply and contends that it
is essentially impervious to judicial review. As to the consistency prong, the
Board discloses that the agency failed to provide all of the information it had
during discovery. As a result, the agency prevented Teacher and this court from
examining the consistency of Teacher's discipline. Yet the Board's argument
blames Teacher for the agency's failure to provide the information. As to the
proportionality pron~ the Board acknowledges it did not follow its own
procedures, but asserts the errors do not matter. Finally, the Board acknowledges
that an appeal to the superintendent is meaningless but asserts this court and
Teacher should take its word for it rather than offer clarity.
The Board addresses the facts in detail. Teacher disputed the facts at the
hearing and believes they are not supported by the evidence, which was less
clear than the Board suggests. However, because Teacher's appeal addresses
procedural errors, rather than factual, Teacher does not respond to the Board's
factual statement. As described below, this court should grant the relief
requested in the opening brief.

1
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Argument

Teacher first explains that the fairness test applies and then addresses
errors regarding the two prongs of that fairness test, the consistency prong and
the proportionality prong. Teacher then addresses the superintendent issue.
1.

The Fairness Test Applies Because No Statute Replaces It

The Board contends that it is exempt from this court's fairness test.
[Resp.Br. at 31.]
The Board mentions Nelson v. City of Orem, where a municipality's
employment decisions were subject to judicial review "for the purpose of
determining if the appeal board [or hearing officer] abused its discretion or
exceeded its authority." 2013 UT 53, ,r 26, 309 P.3d 237 (citing Utah Code§ 10-31106(6)(c)(ii)). Because a statute established an appellate standard of review, the
Utah Supreme Court held that this court's fairness test was "a useful
framework," but not a "stand-alone test." Id.

,r,r 29 & n.25. That same statute

. does not apply here b~cause the Board is no~ a municipality. The B9ard has not
identified a corresponding statute because there is not one.
In the absence of any statute asserting otherwise, this court's fairness does
apply. Taylorsville City v. Taylorsville City Emp. Appeal Bd., 2013 UT App 69, 1 29,
298 P.3d 1270 (citing cases and holding "[i]n the absence of a city ordinance
expressly rejecting this approach, we are convinced that the same standard [the
two-part fairness test] applies here.").

2
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Indeed, this court has continued to apply the test since Nelson. See Burgess

v. Dep't of Corrections, 2017 UT App 186, ,r 35,405 P.3d 937; West Valley City v.
Coyle, 2016 UT App 149, ,r 29, 380 P.3d 327; Hollenbach v. Salt Lake City Civil Serv.
Comm'n, 2015 UT App 116, ,r 17, 349 P.3d 791.1
The Board suggests that administrative rules have the same effect as
statutes. (Resp.Br. at 18 ("these statutes and rules must guide this Court's
review").] But it does not cite a case for the proposition that rules can displace
this court's fairness test. Nelson concerns only a stahtte. 2013 UT 53, ,r 29.
The Board then mischaracterizes Teacher's argument. The Board states that
"Teacher concludes that the Board adopted" the fairness test. [Resp.Br. at 33.] But
Teacher did not suggest it was up to the Board to decide whether to "adopt" it.
Teacher stated that" agency discipline must comply with a two-prong test. ...

This court's fairness test derives from older cases from the Utah Supreme
Court. In the leading case, Matter of Discharge of Jones, the Utah Supreme Court
stated that it would reverse an agency's employment decision if the agency
imposed a "sanction so clearly disproportionate to the charges as to amount to an
abuse of the [entity]'s discretion." 720 P.2d 1356, 1362 (Utah 1986). This court
stated that the question " - 'do the charges warrant the sanction imposed' breaks down into two sub-questions: First, is the sanction proportional; and
second, is the sanction consistent with previous sanctions imposed by the
department pursuant to its own policies." Kelly v. Salt Lake City Civil Serv.
Comm'n, 2000 UT App 235, ,r 21, 8 P.3d 1048 (citing Jones, 720 P.2d at_1361);
Taylorsville, 2013 UT App 69, ,r,r 26, 27. Citing Jones, this court held that an
agency's "discretion is abused, however, if the punishment exceeds the range of
sanctions permitted by statute or regulation, or if, in light of all the
circumstances, the punishment is disproportionate to the offense." Lucas v.
Murray City Civil Serv. Comm'n, 949 P.2d 746, 761 (Utah Ct. App. 1997);
Taylorsville, 2013 UT App 69, ,r,r 27, 29.
1

3
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Mirroring this general rule, the Utah Code allows the Board to take action that it
'finds to be appropriate for and consistent with the educator's behavior.

111

[Op.Br.

at 21.] Said differently, Teacher did not argue that the fairness test applied

because the statute adopted it. Teacher argued that the fairness test applied and
also the statute reflected it.
The Board initially contends consistency and proportionality are not
required. The Board argues that neither the 2014 version nor the 20172 version of
Utah Code section 53A-6-501 requires consistency or proportionality. [Resp.Br. at
33-34.] It states that because the 2014 version does not "mention" consistency, it
does not require consistency. [Id. at 33.] And it asserts the 2017 version requires
that the discipline be consistent only "with the educator's behavior," and thus it
need not be consistent "with other Board disciplinary actions." [Id. at 34.]
The Board suggests that the 2014 statute may apply because "[t]he conduct
for which Teacher was disciplined occurred primarily during the 2014-15 school
year. But the statutory language he relies on did not become effective until July.1,
2015." [Resp.Br. at 33.] The Board's confusion as to which statute applies is

In January 2018, the legislature re-numbered these provisions. For clarity,
Teacher cites to the 2017 version cited in the opening and response briefs. In
particular, where the Board referenced" current" statutes, [Resp.Br. at 33, 34],
Teacher cites the 2017 version in effect when the Board filed its brief.

2
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consistent with Teacher's complaint that the Hearing Report does not identify
the applicable law.3 See infra Argument 3.2.3.
In any event, none of these arguments matter. Nelson maintains fidelity to
the "consistency" prong of the fairness test: "A sanction that is wholly
inconsistent with prior disciplinary practices or department policy would be
arbitrary and capricious." 2013 UT 53, ,r 30. Even the Board concedes that
"consistency has·some relevance to its disciplinary decisions,"·and that, "if
Teacher's consistency argument was not waived, the Board recognizes that its
decision must be reversed and this matter remanded." [Resp.Br. at 38,39.]
The Board's argument that statute and rule supplant the proportionality
prong also fails. Every relevant version uses the term" appropriate." Utah Code
§§ 53A-6-501(1)(a) (2014), 53A-6-501(5)(a) (2017), 53A-6-102(2)(b)(iv) (2014 &
2017). This court has used the term "appropriate" interchangeably with
"proportional": "In determining whether the sanction of dismissal is warranted
in this case, the Commission must affirm the sanction if it is (1) appropriate to the
offense and (2) consistent with previous sanctions imposed by the department."

Harmon v. Ogden City Civil Serv. Comm'n, 2007 UT App 336, ,r 8,171 P.3d 474

Teacher's discovery requests included a request for" all Utah Educator
Standards and rules governing UPPAC investigations, hearings, and disciplinees
in place at the time that the conduct alleged in USOE' s Complaint was
committed." [R.31.] The agency's discovery response stated that Teacher may be
suspended under Utah Code 53A-8-101, which was repealed in 2013. [R.40; see
Utah Code§ 53A-8-101, repealed by laws 2013, c. 278, § 83, eff. May 14, 2013.]
3

5
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(internal quotation marks omitted); see also Guenon v. Midvale City, 2010 UT App
51, ,r 15, 230 P.3d 1032. If the question is whether a penalty is II appropriate,"
appellate review still requires a proportionality review.
Other statutes suggest that the legislature intended for Board penalties to
be consistent and proportionate. The legislature found that "the implementation
of a comprehensive continuum of data-driven strategies regarding ... licensure
... is essential.'~ Utah Code§ 53A-6-102(2)(a)(iii) (2014 & 2017). Strategies that are
"data-driven" should be consistent. Likewise, the Code requires that educators
"have access to a process for fair examination and review of allegations made
against them and for the administration of appropriate sanctions against those
found, in accordance with due process, to have failed to conduct themselves in a
manner commensurate with their authority and responsibility ...." Id. § 53A-6102(2)(b)(iv) (2014 & 2017).
The Board also cites Utah Code section 53A-6-307 (2014), which states:
~'Nothing in this chapter limits or abrogates the power of the board to issue or
revoke licenses, hold hearings, or otherwise carry out its functions~" [Resp.Br. at
33-34.] That statute speaks to "this chapter." It does not speak to judicial review.
Nor could it, given this court's jurisdiction to review decisions of a state agency.
Utah Code§ 78A-4-103(2)(a)(i)(A).
This court should clarify that its fairness test applies to the Board, and that
if it does not, the Board is not free to impose inconsistent or disproportionate

6
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sanctions. Even the Board acknowledges that fairness "has some relevance."
[Resp.Br. at 38.]
After arguing that the fairness test does not apply, the Board defends the
agency's attempts to ensure it could not be implemented. Teacher replies first to
the consistency issue and then to the proportionality issue.
2.

Consistency Prong - the Board Admits It Did Not Disclose All Its
Evidence

As early as his Response to Complaint and as late as his Request to
Superintendent, Teacher made clear that the fairness test applied. In his
Response to Complaint, he requested relief and stated that "[t]he relief requested
is required by law as it is proportional to the misconduct and consistent with
past UPPAC recommendations and Board actions." [R.20.] In his Request to
Superintendent, Teacher stated "the discipline imposed by an agency must be
consistent with its past disciplinary practices. See Cook, 2015 UT App 64, ,I 24. In
this case, the Reports' recommendations ... do not rely on past UPPAC
'

'

.

'

.

disciplinary practices." [R.318.] Teacher also argued to the superintendent that
"the Panel failed to cite to any previous disciplinary proceedings or practices that
guided its decision." [R.319.]
At the time, the Board "agree[d] that UPPAC' s recommendation must be
consistent with prior practice," and re-asserted that Teacher "has the burden to
show that the recommendation is inconsistent with prior practice. He has failed
to do so." [R.394.] Even now, although the Board contends the fairness test does

7
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not apply, it concedes that" consistency has some relevance to its disciplinary
decisions." [Resp.Br. at 38.]
Teacher has consistently argued that the agency failed to make this
possible. In the opening brief, Teacher explained the discovery exchange. [Op.Br.
at 24.] Teacher requested "the details of all discipline ... of any [Granite School
District] employee regarding inappropriate discipline or treatment of students,
or harassing, insulting, or intimidating behavior from January 1, 2013 to date ~ ..
includ[ing] ... the discipline received, the details of the infraction ... , the names
of the supervisors ... , the school ... , the [employee's] prior disciplinary history
... , [etc.]" [R.30.] He also requested "all UPPAC case files and evidence files for
UPPAC investigations of educators disciplined for inappropriate discipline or
treatment of students, or harassing, insulting, or intimidating behavior in the
previous 3 years." [Id.]
The agency provided newsletters that included brief summaries of
discipline imposed in 2016. [R.64-72,493; Op.Br. at 24.] Teacher requested.similar.
summaries for 2014 and 2015. [R.521; Op.Br. at24.] The agency responded, "We
don't have the summaries of all UPPAC cases going back three years." [R.520;
Op.Br. at 24.] Accepting that as a true statement, Teacher did not pursue the
matter further.
To be clear, Teacher did not request summaries; he requested "details of all
discipline" and "all" relevant files. [R.30; Op.Br. at 24.] The Board responded with

8
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a summary, as if that was the most it could provide. When Teacher asked for
more summaries, the Board said it did not have them. [R.521.]
On appeal, Teacher asserted that the agency's response to Teacher's
discovery request was narrower than requested and that, 11 if true, the agency's
practice of failing to keep summaries and failing to provide adequate
comparatives to respondents also necessarily means that the agency fails to
apply the correct legal standard to discipline cases." [Op.Br. at 25.] Teacher
continued, "the agency itself has no way of determirung whether its sanctions are
consistent." [Id.] Teacher contended that the agency's practice of providing
minimal information is "troubling because it prevents Teacher from being able to
carry his burden to show the Panel - and this court - that the imposed
punishment is inconsistent with past practice." [Id.] Teacher asked this court to
reverse and instruct the Board that it must apply the proper legal standard (i.e.
the fairness test), and that, in turn, the agency must "both retain and provide
information concerning discipline in other cases." [Id.]
Now, the Board makes these surprising statements: "UPPAC never said it
has no records or knowledge of past disciplinary proceedings; it simply told
Teacher that it had no ready-made summaries of prior disciplinary actions like
the summaries it produced for 2016." [Resp.Br. at 35.] The Board makes a similar
statement in its fact section, saying that Teacher "never ... sought to compel .

complete answers to these discovery requests." [Id. at 10 (emphasis added).]

9
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These statements are stunning because they reveal that the agency had
records and knowledge of past disciplinary proceedings, it failed to disclose
them, and it misled Teacher into believing it had disclosed everything it had.

If this is true, then the Board has admitted that the agency failed to make full and
complete discovery.
The Board fails to acknowledge its error. Instead, it blames Teacher and
. defends the agency by saying that Teacher "liked the information enough that he
still asked for more of the same for 2014 and 2105 [sic]. And when UPPAC said it
didn't have more summaries like that, Teacher dropped the matter." [Resp.Br. at
36; see also id. at 10.]

That is inaccurate. Teacher accepted the agency's disclosures as complete
and its representation as true. There was nothing else to ask. But apparently the
agency was not being truthful or complete when it responded to the discovery
request. It should not have disclosed only a 2016 summary; it should have
disclosed everything it had. This is the agency's error, not Teacher's. .
The Board claims that Teacher failed to ·"preserve" the issue or waived it,
that "it's his own fault because he never raised this discovery issue with the
UPPAC hearing officer," that "Teacher cannot now complain on appeal about an

issue that could have been resolved by the hearing officer but was not because ..
Teacher never raised it." [Resp.Br. at 36-38; see id. at 10.] The Board says this "is

10
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all the more glaring because Teacher did seek to compel production of other
unrelated discovery about school district witnesses." [Id.]
The Board misunderstands. Preservation does not mean that Teacher must
complain to the Hearing Officer that the agency is either lying or failing to keep
records. Teacher's motion to compel other unrelated discovery makes sense,
given that the Board refused to disclose that information. [R.504.] The Board did
not refuse to disclose the comparative information; rather, it said it did not have
more summaries, suggesting that it had disclosed everything it had. [R.520.] If in
fact the agency had disclosed everything it had, there was nothing the Hearing
Officer could have done to "resolve" the matter. The Board's arguments make
sense only now that it admits that the agency failed to make a full and complete
disclosure.

In short, an agency cannot minimally respond to a discovery request,
mislead regarding the amount of information it provided, and then claim that the
'

'

requesting party did not preserve the issue. Teacher does not "waive" an
argument by failing to doubt or pursue the agency's veracity.
2.1

The Information Allows Teacher to Bear His Burden to Argue
Consistency and this Court to Review Teacher's Arguments

The Board asserts that, "more importantly," past data points are irrelevant.
[Resp.Br. at 36.] The Board posits that the disciplinary presumptions are based on
past actions, so ~, [a ]s long as the Board's decisions follow these guidelines, it's

11
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[sic] disciplinary actions will presumably be consistent over time and across
educators." [Id. at 36.]
This position echoes its position that the fairness test does not apply. Were
it true, it would undercut this court's ability to review its decisions. But it is not
true precisely because educators and this court need a metric by which they not the Board - can assess whether decisions are consistent. As explained in the
•opening brief, it is Teacher's burden to prove-consistency .. [Op.Br. at23.] That
does not mean he must take the Board's word for it.
Teacher agrees that if the Board follows the presumptions consistently, its
discipline may be consistent. But, without data, there is no way to know whether
the Board follows the presumptions consistently. If, for example, the Board
issues a no-less-than-three-year suspension while similar cases yielded a oneyear suspension, or if it exceeded the presumptions on the basis of aggravating
or mitigating factors, an educator would have no way of addressing the matter.
To guard against this possibility, Teacher requested similar .case files. The Board
now makes dear that it had, but did not provide, that information.
The Board concedes that if Teacher preserved the issue, this court should
remand so that the Board can provide comparator evidence. [Resp.Br. at 39.]
Teacher preserved the issue, so remand is appropriate . Teacher turns to the scope
of remand. Teacher agrees with the Board that the entire hearing process does
not need to be redone. [Id. at 41.] Teacher never requested a new hearing.

12
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2.2

Scope of Remand
II

Teacher requested the details of all discipline ... of any [Granite School
District] employee regarding inappropriate discipline or treatment of students,
or harassing, insulting, or intimidating behavior from January 1, 2013 to date ...
includ[ing] ... the discipline received, the details of the infraction ... , the names
of the supervisors ... , the school ... , the [employee's] prior disciplinary history
... , etc." [R.30.] He also requested "all UPPAC case files and evidence files for
UPPAC investigations of educators disciplined for inappropriate discipline or
treatment of students, or harassing, insulting, or intimidating behavior in the
previous 3 years." [Id.]
II

The case file" includes "the original notification of misconduct with
supporting documentation, correspondence with the Executive Secretary, the
investigative report, the stipulated agreement, the hearing report, and the final
disposition of the case." Utah Admin. Code R277-210-2(51). The "evidence file"
includes "materials, written or otherwise, obtained by the UPPAC investigator
during the course of the attorney's investigation" and "correspondence between
the Investigator and the educator or the educator's counsel." Id. R277-210-2(52). 4
The Board concedes that Teacher "needs ... the factual findings, the final
discipline action, and the Board's reasoning," which the Board states can be

Teacher requests these items individually. If the administrative rule were to
change, Teacher would still contend he was entitled to these items.

4
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found in "[t]he investigative report, the stipulated agreement or hearing report,
and the Board's final disposition." [Resp.Br. at 40.]
With that concession, four items remain in dispute:
•

the original notification of misconduct with supporting
documentation;

• correspondence with the Executive Secretary;
•

materials, written or otherwise, obtained by the UPPAC investigator
during the course of the attorney's investigation; and

• correspondence betvveen the Investigator and the educator or the
educator's counsel.
The Board argues that this information is "burdensome to produce and
could never all be admitted in a hearing," and that "Teacher does not necessarily
need information for every 'boundary violation' case, but rather only those that
involve discipline for similar behavior." [Resp.Br. at 40.]
First, the Board's claim that it is "burdensome" should be rejected because
the Board has not provided any information regarding how many cases are
.

.

.

.

relevant or how large those files are. This court should not simply accept its
representation that the task is "burdensome." In any event, it is not burdensome.
It is a matter of photocopying or emailing documents that are already gathered.
Second, the information may not all need to be admitted in a hearing.
Teacher need only review the information and make his own assessment as to
whether the discipline he received is consistent with past practice. That the
information need not all be admitted does not defeat the purpose of Teacher's
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request, which is to review the information to determine whether he has been
treated fairly.
Third, all "boundary violation" cases do matter. Teacher and this court
must be able to determine what sort of penalty has traditionally been
appropriate. Perhaps the Board has consistently imposed three-year suspensions
for this behavior - a revelation that would help, not hurt, the Board's case. On
the other hand, if suspensions for this behavior have typically been lower, then ·
Teacher is entitled to make a consistency argument to the Panel and this court.
The information is critical because it establishes the background of each
case. The investigative report, the hearing report, and the final disposition
should be based on the evidence uncovered. Teacher should have the same
information the agency has. Teacher can filter the cases he wishes to rely on, as
can the agency. Teacher is entitled to assess whether the conclusions drawn from
the evidence in his case are similar to the conclusions drawn from the evidence in
other cases. Without the underlying evidence, those comparisons are impossible.
Fourth, quantity of information is no reason to limit access. The Board
asserts that "the information Teacher requested ... greatly exceeds what is found
in case precedent." [Id. at 40.] But courts do not limit parties' access to cases

because of size. If a case is public, lawyers can access the entire case file. It is
particularly important for the information to be disseminated because the agency
is the exclusive holder of information. Access to information helps ensure
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consistency by decision-makers. It is unfair for the agency to do the initial filter,
where Teacher does not know what information he has not been given.
3.

Proportionality Prong - the Agency Failed to Follow Its Own
Administrative Rules, Making It Impossible for this Court to Review
Proportionality
Teacher argued that the agency failed to follow its administrative rules at

several levels. Teacher asserted that the Board's failure to follow its own
administrative.rul~s was both inherer:itly_problematic and p~eju~iced him
because the errors eliminate the court's ability to conduct a proportionality
review. [Op.Br. at 12,22.]

In response, the Board concedes the agency made errors, but contends the
errors are harmless. For instance, the Board acknowledges that the hearing report
failed to state what presumption UPAAC applied, but states "there's no mystery
here." [Resp.Br. at 23.] The Board acknowledges that Teacher demonstrated
prejudice, but says the identified prejudice is not really harmful. [Resp.Br. at 35
(citing Op.Br. at ~,25).] Alternatively, it.turns to insulting Teac?er~ For example,
it writes that Teacher's arguments are "far-fetched" and "hard to take seriously,
especially from a career educator with a master's degree." [Resp.Br. at 19,25.] It
states that Teacher "professes confusion" and has "apparent unfamiliarity with
professional expectations." [Id. at 21,22.] This is an unfortunate tack by the Board,
given that the evidence presented was inconsistent and shaky at best, and that
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Teacher is entitled to have a clear explanation of exactly what the Board found
and exactly why the Board imposed its penalty.
Setting aside these personal attacks, Teacher responds as follows.
3.1

Inherent Error in Administrative Setting

As explained in the opening brief, "[i]n disciplinary proceedings, a public
body must comply with its own rules and an employee being disciplined is
entitled to rely upon those rules." Lucas v. Murray City Civil Serv. Comm'n, 949
P.2d 746, 754 (Utah Ct. App. 1997) (quotation simplified). "[A]dministrative
regulations are presumed to be reasonable and valid and cannot be ignored or
followed by the agency to suit its own purposes. Such is the essence of arbitrary
and capricious action." Dep't of Cmty. Affairs v. Utah Merit Sys. Council, 614 P.2d
1259, 1263 (Utah 1980).
Moreover, in addition to simply complying with its own rules, an agency
is required to "state its findings, identify the applicable law, and articulate its
logic." Adams v. Bd. ofRev.,.821 P.2d 1, 7-8 (Utah Ct. App. 1991). Otherwise, "it
may discover that critical facts are not properly before it, that the law is other
than anticipated, or that its initial logic is flawed. In such situations, a result
contrary to the initial conclusions of the body may be dictated." Id. "The process
of articulation clearly enhances agency self-discipline and protects against
arbitrary and capricious decisions." Id. at 8. "If any agency's logical process is
flawed, its shortcomings can be corrected on review, but only if the agency
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creates findings revealing the evidence upon which it relies, the law upon which
it relies, and its interpretation of the law." Id.
It is worth noting that the agency makes rules with limited public input.
The Board establishes UPP AC' s duties and procedures, staffs UPPAC, and asks
UPPAC to recommend procedures for hearings. Utah Code §§ 53£-6-503, -506, 607 (2018). Yet, as demonstrated, the Board follows its rules haphazardly,
sporadically, and arbitrarily. This is particularly alarming because the Board
wields great power over educators' careers. The Board acknowledges that the
requirements of due process must be met, but limits that requirement to asking
whether the educator is "heard," with little concern as to whether its procedures
are being followed. [Resp.Br. at 18 n.2.]
3.2

The Errors Were Harmful Because They Prevent Teacher and this
Court from Reviewing the Proportionality Prong

Teacher asserted that the Hearing Report does not comply with rule R277212-13(1) (a)-( d) of the Utah Administrative Code. Specifically, the Hearing
Report .did not include conclusions of law, relevant precedent, applicable law
and rule, or the presumptions applied by the agency. [Op.Br. at 13.]
Teacher asserted that these errors made it "impossible for Teacher to know
precisely why he is being punished." [Id. at 15.] Teacher added, "Teacher - and
this court - can only speculate as to which offenses correspond to these factual

findings." [Id.] Teacher also argued these errors prejudiced him because the
Hearing Report's failure to tie factual findings to presumptions made it ,.,. utterly
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impossible to determine whether the punishment exceeds the range of sanctions
permitted by statute or regulation because it failed to identify both the offense
and the presumption." [Id. at 22.] In short, Teacher asserted the Hearing Report
lays out a category of findings of fact, a category of offenses, and then imposes a
punishment. It asks Teacher and this court to do the work of connecting the dots.
Gib

The Board responds that "reading the rule quickly reveals which
standards his conduct violated" and ('there's no other reasonable conclusion in
context" and "there's no mystery here." [Resp.Br. at 23.] Said differently, the
Board admits that the Hearing Report fails to follow the rule, but states that
Teacher and the court can and should speculate as to which factual findings
correspond to which offenses and which presumptions.
This makes it difficult or impossible for Teacher or this court to know
whether the penalty he received is proportionate to the offenses. It also makes it
difficult for Teacher to meaningfully review the record and assess whether the
evidence supports the offenses or whether he should appeal on that basis. Given
the dearth of comparative information, Teacher is operating in a vacuum as to
whether his punishment was fair. The Board takes the position that it is fair
because it said it was fair. But the court's fairness tests exists to provide the court
and the employee a metric by which they can know whether the punishment the
employee received was appropriate.
As to the specific errors, Teacher replies to the Board as follows.

~
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3.2.1

Subsection (a)

Teacher asserted that the hearing report failed to render conclusions of
law, as required by rule R277-212-13(1)(a). [Op.Br. at 14.] Teacher stated: "The
Report does not adhere to requirement (a) because it does not provide
conclusions of law based upon the evidence. In fact, at no time does it identify
the violations Teacher committed or what evidence supports those violations."

[Id. at 14.] Teacher asserted that it rendered only Findings of Fact.
In response, the Board copies the Findings of Fact, and states they crossreference the Complaint. [Resp.Br. at 20.] But the cited paragraphs of the
Complaint also make exclusively factual assertions. [R.11-12.] This confirms
Teacher's point: the Hearing Report does not tie the facts to an offense.
The Board contends that the error is harmless, saying it is "irrelevant" if
the Hearing Report "mislabel[ed]" Findings and Conclusions. [Resp.Br. at 21.]
Teacher did not argue that they were mislabeled; Teacher stated there were no
Conclusions of Law and "the difference is not mere nomenclature." [Op.Br. at
.

.

15.] Teacher argued that merely citing to rule R277-515 is unhelpful because that
rule lists "dozens of standards, ranging from 'may not be convicted of any felony
or misdemeanor offense' ... to 'shall encourage a student's best effort in an
assessment."' [Id. at 15-16.] The Board states that only thirteen (actually fourteen)
of those dozens of standards were identified in the Hearing Report. [Resp.Br. at
20.] But again, those standards identify offenses, followed by the general
conclusion that Teacher violated R277-515. [R.287.] The Panel's failure to tie

20
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

factual findings to offenses and offenses to presumptions deprives Teacher and
this court of the ability to evaluate his penalty.
3.2.2

Subsection (b)

Next Teacher asserted that the Hearing Report failed to identify a
statement of relevant precedent, as required by rule R277-212-13(1)(b). [Op.Br. at
14.] The Board responds it does not have to do this because no precedent is
available. [Resp.Br. at 21.] The Board states "Teacher does not point to and the
Board is not aware of any available, relevant precedent that should have been
cited." [Id.] The Board's response fits hand-in-glove with Teacher's complaint
about the lack of comparative information. Teacher cannot provide precedent
because no cases have made it to this court since the 2014 amendments, and the
agency refused to provide relevant precedent during discovery.
Because the Board discloses that it does have more information, [Resp.Br.
at 10, 35], it is not true that no precedent is available. But if it is true that no
precedent is available, then, again, Teacher asks this .court to instruct the agency

Gi

that it must "both retain and provide information concerning discipline in other
cases." [Op.Br. at 25.] Either way, the Board cannot avoid this requirement by
claiming no precedent exists.
Comparative information is not a hoop for the agency to jump through. It
is important so that Teacher and this court can compare his sanction to others.
This court recently reversed a termination decision because the comparative
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information revealed that one employee had been fired while another was only
demoted for similar offenses. Burgess v. Dep' t of Corrections, 2017 UT App 186,

,r 52,405 P.3d 937. The agency's failure to provide precedent in its decision, like
its failure to provide adequate comparative data during discovery, blocks
Teacher's and this court's ability to conduct a meartingful review.
3.2.3

Subsection (c)

Teacher asserted that the Hearing Reportfailed to provide a statement of
applicable law and rule, as required by rule R277-212-13(l)(c). [Op.Br. at 14.] The
Board responds that it did provide the applicable rule because it cited R277-515.
[Resp.Br. at 21.] The Board all but concedes that the one law it did provide does
not apply: district and statutory prohibitions on corporal punishment. [Id. at 21
n.3.]
The Board did not cite or apply the fairness test or any controlling statute.
The Board's citation to rule R277-515 does not adequately explain the law.
3.2.4

Subsectio11 (d)

Teacher asserted that the Hearing Report failed to include the
presumptions applied by the agency, as required by rule R277-212-13(1)(d).
[Op.Br. at 16.] The Board responds that "there's no mystery here," and that "any
reasonably informed person" should be able to figure it out. [Resp.Br. at 23.]
The administrative rule does not say that sufficient-clarity is needed only if
there is a "mystery" or if "any reasonably informed person" could not figure it
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<iv

out. It states that the "hearing officer shall sign and issue a hearing report ... that
includes ... presumptions applied by UPPAC." Utah Adm.in. Code R277-21213(1). This one does not.
And this is harmful because nearly all of the items mentioned in paragraph
5 would warrant a penalty of "minimal or lesser discipline" or "short term
suspension/ suspension up to one year" under the presumptions. [R.401.] For
example, the first item listed is "to be familiar with professional ethics and the
standards required under applicable state rule." [R.286.] Failure to "be familiar
with professional ethics" does not justify a no-less-than-three-year suspension.
In contrast, a suspension of three or more years is presumed appropriate
for illegal behavior, such as if the teacher has an illegal physical, sexual
relationship with a student; is convicted of various crimes; or provides alcohol or
drugs to a student. [R.402.] These have not been alleged and so a suspension of
three or more years is not appropriate.
A suspension.of one to three years is presumed appropriate for certain
offenses, some of which likely apply. [R.401-02.] But again, the Board did not
impose a suspension of one to three years; it imposed a suspension of "not less
than three years." The items that are listed could fall within the one-to-three year

23

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

range, but an appropriate penalty would be more precise, such as "two years,"
not a range.s
In any event, the penalty imposed was higher than that, "not less than
three years." And the panel said it intended to impose discipline "at the high end
of the suggested range," whereas "not less than three years" is at the low end of
a higher range. [R.288.] Moreover, "not less than three years" might mean three
years and one day, or it might mean twenty years. The Board does not say. It
provides a floor for a penalty, not a penalty. 6 Given the lack of precision and
clarity, the Panel's failure to follow its own rules fails to inform Teacher of the
offense and the penalty.
3.3

Other Errors

Teacher argued that UPPAC' s minutes further blurred the issue because it
stated that the suspension would be for three years, which was inconsistent with

The Board claims it "·can't suspend a license for just three years (or any other
finite time period) because the license remains suspended until the educator
successfully completes the reinstatement process." [Resp.Br. at 15.] But the Board
can, and usually does, set a period that ends, at which point the educator applies
for reinstatement. Here, the Board has not done that.
6 The Board admits that, after the suspension period has run,Teacher is entitled
only to a reinstatement hearing, not necessarily to have his license reinstated.
[Resp.Br. at 15; see generally Utah Admin. Code R277-213.] Regardless of the
outcome, the process for reinstating one's license is time consuming. If an
educator's license is reinstated, the school year hiring cycle frequently means that
it takes an educator another year or two to obtain a job. Thus, a "no-less-thanthree-year" suspension is, in reality, a minimum of about five years before an
educator works again.

·5
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the Hearing Report, and that the Superintendent erred when she allowed
UPPAC to respond but did not allow Teacher to reply. [Op.Br. at 18-20.]
The Board responds that "quibbling about possible inconsistencies in
UPPAC' s recommendation is pointless. They're just recommendations. Only the
Board can impose discipline, and it's the Board's decision that gets reviewed on
appeal." [Resp.Br. at 25-26.] This is not true. The Panel acts as the jury in these
cases and their recommendation is taken very seriously. The point of Teacher's
argument was that he should be correctly informed of the penalty and that he
was not because the proceeding was fuzzy at every stage. [Op.Br. at 18.]
The Superintendent's error matters because Teacher is entitled to present
his case. The Board correctly states the rule "says nothing- one way or the other
- about response briefs." [Resp.Br. at 27.] Said differently, the rule does not allow
for a response, and it does not disallow a reply. Either the Board should not have
been given a chance to respond or Teacher should have been given the
opportunity to reply.
The Board states that ,.,no one had ever told Teacher he couldn't file a reply
before the superintendent's decision." [Id. at 13.] But the superintendent ruled
only five days after the Board submitted its response, so the time constraints
effectively prevented one. [Id. at 12, R.404.]
The Board then asserts that Teacher's argument is absurd: "It's even
harder to understand why Teacher thinks he can file something not expressly
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mentioned by the rules ... but UPP AC can't." [Id. at 28.] In fact, the opposite is
absurd: there is no reason that the agency should be able to file a non-named
brief but Teacher should not be able to reply to it.
The Board states there is no constitutional right to a reply brief, and that
11

[i]f Teacher were right, UPPAC would presumably have the right to a sur-reply,

and so on and so on in a never-ending chain of constitutionally-guaranteed reply
• briefs." [Id. at 28.] This is silly. Customarily, the moving party is entitled to a .
reply and the non-moving party is not entitled to a sur-reply. Utah R. Civ. P. 7,
11

Utah R. App. P. 24, Utah R. Juv. P. 19A. Teacher does not request a neverending chain of constitutionally-guaranteed reply briefs." He requests either the
response brief be rejected or the opportunity to file a reply brief.
Above all, Teacher requests that the agency hot spontaneously revise its
II

rules to suit its own purposes [because s]uch is the essence of arbitrary and
1

capricious action." Dep t of Cmty. Affairs, 614 P.2d at 1263.
4.. .

Review by Superintendent .

Finally, the Board suggests this court should deny Teacher's request for
guidance regarding the superintendent's review. The Board asserts that the
II

clarification would have no meaningful impact on the present dispute."
II

[Resp.Br. at 41.] The Board asserts the issue is a :µ,.oot point because Teacher did
appeal to the superintendent." [Id. at 41-42.] This court can consider the matter
under the public interest exception to the mootness doctrine. That exception
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allows a court to consider a technically moot issue if it "(1) affect[s] the public
interest, (2) [is] likely to recur, and (3) because of the brief time that any one
litigant is affected, [is] likely to evade review." State v. Steed, 2015 UT 76, ,r 7, 357
P.3d 547. Each requirement is met here.
First, courts frequently retain jurisdiction of otherwise moot cases where
the issues involve "class actions, questions of constitutional interpretation, issues
· as to the validity or construction of a statute, or the propriety of administrative
rulings." McRae v. Jackson, 526 P.2d 1190, 1191 (Utah 1974) (overruled by Utah

Transit Auth. v. Local 382 ofAmalgamated Transit Union, 2012 UT 75, ,r 31 n.18, 289
P.3d 582 (overruling McRae to the extent it suggested that the public interest
exception to the mootness doctrine requires "nothing more than a showing that a
matter involved the public interest")). Because this case centers on the
construction of a rule, it fits within the public interest exception.
Second, "'there must be a reasonable expectation or a demonstrated
probability that the same controversy will recur."' Utah Transit Auth. -v. Local 382

of Amalgamated Transit Union, 2012 UT 75,

,r 36, 289 P.3d 582 (quoting Murphy v.

Hunt, 455 U.S. 478, 482 (1982)). The same controversy will recur every time an
educator wishes to appeal a disciplinary action.
Third, this issue is likely to evade judicial review if it is not addressed.
"Issues that are likely to evade judicial review are those that are inherently short
in duration such that a court will likely be unable to hear the issue when it still
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presents a live controversy." Steed, 2015 UT 76, ,r 9. Future litigants either will
waste their resources asking the superintendent for review just to be sure they
did not skip a step, or they will not and risk having their appeal barred because
they skipped a step. Because the issue is likely to evade judicial review, this court
should answer the question presented.
The Board also argues that "[t]he administrative rules do not require a
. review by the superintendent.". [Resp.Br. at 42.] This court should not take the
Board's word for it. The Board's position may trap a future appellant who relies
on this statement and does not petition for the superintendent's review. As
described in the opening brief, this court should offer guidance so there is no
question later.
Finally, the Board argues that the court is bound by the policy judgments
of the legislature even if it fundamentally disagrees with them. [Id. at 43.] But this
case is not about policy judgments of the legi.slature. This case is about whether the
agency followed its own .rules.
Conclusion

This court should reverse. Given the Board's revelation that it did not
disclose all the comparative evidence it had, this court should remand with
instructions that it provide that information, allow Teacher to make a consistency
argument if necessary, and issue a Hearing Report that complies with Utah law.
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§ SJA-6-102. Legislative findings on teacher... , U.C.A. 1953 § 53A-6-102

Utah Statutes Annotated - 2014
West's Utah Code Annotated
Title 53a. State System of Public Education
Chapter 6. Educator Llcensing and Professional Practices Act
Part 1. General Provisions

U.C.A. 1953 § 53A-6-102
§ 53A-6-102. Legislative findings on teacher quality--Declaration of education as a profession

Currenbless

O)(a) The Legislature ackno~ledges that education is per4aps the most important fun~tion of state and local
governments, recognizing that the future success of our state and nation depend in large part upon the existence of a
responsible and educated citizenry.

(b) The Legislature further acknowledges that the primary responsibility for the education of children within the state
resides with their parents or guardians and that the role of state and local governments is to support and assist parents
in fulfilling that responsibility.

(2)(a) The Legislature finds that:

(i) quality teaching is the basic building block of successful schools and, outside of home and family circumstances,
the essential component of student achievement;

(ii) the high quality of teachers is absolutely essential to enhance student achievement and to assure educational
excellence in each classroom in the state's public schools; and

(iii) the implementation of a comprehensive continuum of data-driven strategies regarding recruitment, preservice,
licensure, induction, professional development, and evaluation is essential if the state and its citizens expect every
classroom to be staffed by a skilled, caring, and effective teacher.

(b) In providing for the safe and effective performance of the function of educating Utah's children, the Legislature
further fmds it to be of critical importance that education, including instruction, administrative, and supervisory
services, be recognized as a profession, and that those who are licensed or seek to become licensed and to serve as
educators:

(i) meet high standards both as to qualifications and fitness for service as educators through quality recruitment
and preservice programs before assuming their responsibilities in the schools;
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(ii) maintain those standards i1:1 t~e perform~nce of their duties while holding licenses, in large part through
participating in induction and ongoing professional development programs focused on instructional improvement;

(iii) receive fair, systematic evaluations of their performance at school for the purpose of enhancing the quality of
public education and student achievement; and

(iv) have access to a process for fair examination and review of allegations made against them and for the
administration of appropriate sanctions against those found, in accordance with due process, to have failed to
conduct themselves in a manner commensurate with their authority and responsibility to provide appropriate
professional services to the children of the state.

Credits
Laws 1999, c. 108, § 3, eff. July 1, 1999; Laws 2001, c. 86, § 10, eff. April 30, 2001; Laws 2013, c. 49, § 1, eff. May 14, 2013.
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§ 53A-6-307. Powers of state board not abrogated, U.C.A. 1953 § 53A-6-307

Utah Statutes Annotated - 2014
West's Utah Code Annotated
Title 53a. State System of Public Education
Chapter 6. Educator Licensing and Professional Practices Act .
. Part 3. Utah Professional Practices Advisory Commission
U.C.A. 1953 § 53A-6-307
§ 53A-6-307. Powers of state board not abrogated

Currentness
Nothing in this chapter limits or abrogates th~ power of the board to issue or. revoke licenses, hold hearings, .or otherwise
carry out its functions.

Credits
Laws 1999, c. 108, § 17, eff. July 1, 1999.

HISTORICAL AND STATUTORY NOTES
Prior Laws:
Laws 1988, c. 2, § 118.
C. 1953, § 53A-7-113.
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Utah Statutes Annotated - 2014
West's Utah Code Annotated
Title 53a. State System of Public Education
Chapter 6. Educator Licensing and Professional Practices Act
Part 5. Conduct of Educators
U.C.A. 1953 § 53A-6-501
§ 53A-6-501. Disciplinary action against educator

Currentness
(l)(a) The board shall talc~ appropriate action against a person who is, or at the time pf an alleged offense was, the.
holder of a, license, and:

(i) who, after having had a reasonable opportunity to contest the allegation, has been found pursuant to a
criminal, civil, or administrative action to have exhibited behavior evidencing unfitness for duty, including immoral,
unprofessional, or incompetent conduct, or other violation of standards of ethical conduct, performance, or
professional competence; or

(ii) who has been alleged to have exhibited such behavior or committed such a violation.

(b) Prior to taking action based upon an allegation or the decision of an administrative body other than UPPAC, the
board shall direct UPPAC to review the allegations and any related administrative action and provide fmdings and
recommendations to the board.

(c) No adverse recommendation may be made without giving the accused person an opportunity for a hearing.

(d) The board's action may include:

(i) revocation or suspension of a license;

(ii) restriction or prohibition of recertification;

(iii) a warning or reprimand;

(iv) required participation in and satisfactory completion of a rehabilitation or remediation program; or

(v) other action which the board finds to be appropriate after a review of the UPPAC findings and recommendations.
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. (e) Th~ license hqlder is responsible for the costs of rehabilitation or remediation required under this section.

(2)(a) Upon receipt of findings or recommendations from UPPAC, the board shall permanently revoke the license of
a person who:

(i) is convicted of a sexual offense under Title 76, Chapter 5, Part 4, Sexual Offenses, against a minor child;

(ii) engages in sexually explicit conduct, as defined in Section 76-5b-103, with a student who is a minor; or

(iii) engages in sexually explicit conduct, as defined in Section 76-5b-103, with a student who is:

(A) not a minor; and

(B) enrolled in a school where the person is employed.

(b) Upon receipt of findings or recommendation from UPPAC, the board may permanently revoke the license of a
person who has exhibited other behavior which the board finds to be irremediable.

Credits
Laws 1999, c. 108, § 23, eff. July 1, 1999; Laws 2008, c. 189, § 1, eff. May 5, 2008; Laws 2008, c. 190, § 1, eff. May 5,
2008; Laws 2011, c. 320, § 3, eff. May 10, 2011.

HISTORICAL AND STATUTORY NOTES
Composite section by the Office of Legislative Research and General Counsel of Laws 2008, c. 189, § 1 and Laws 2008,
C. 190, § 1.
· Prior Laws:
Laws 1993, c. 113, § 1.
C. 1953, § 53A-6-301.

CROSS REFERENCES
Requirements for charter schools, employment of educators, licensure, see§ 53A-la-507.
LIBRARY REFERENCES
Schools ►147.9.
Westlaw Key Number Search: 345k147.9.
C.J.S. Civil Rights§ 138.
C.J.S. Schools and School Districts§§ 245,259,265,271 to 272,275 to 276.
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NOTES OF DECISIONf,
Civil rights 2
Quasi-judicial immunity I

1 Quasi-judicial immunity
Quasi-judicial immunity would protect members of board of education and professional practices advisory commission,
in connection with former teacher's suit challenging refusal to return teaching certificate, if board and commission
members performed traditional adjudicatory function when they held reinstatement hearing and refused to reinstate
certificate, board and commission members decided cases of sufficient controversy that they would be subject to many
actions for damages by disappointed parties absent immunity, and sufficient safeguards existed within regulatory
framework to protect constitutional rights. Ambus v. Utah State Bd. of Educ., 1993, 858 P.2d 1372. Judges~ 36
Admission of evidence derived from .former teacher's expunged record in connection with hearing concerning
reinstatement of certificate was protected by quasi-judicial immunity even if decision was later reversed; fact that
decision was subsequently held to be erroneous did not alter adjudicatory nature of decision. U.C.A.1953, 53A-l-101 to
53A-1-407, 53A-7-101 to 53A-7-204. Ambus v. Utah State Bd. of Educ., 1993, 858 P.2d 1372. Judges~ 36
Executive secretary of State Professional Practice Advisory Commission who sent complaint and notice to teacher
regarding disciplinary proceedings was entitled to quasi-judicial immunity as, when sending notice of adjudicatory
determination, secretary was administrative official performing task functionally equivalent to that of court clerk. Ambus
v. Utah State Bd. of Educ., 1993, 858 P.2d 1372. Judges 4p::, 36

2 Civil rights
Civil rights action for damages could not be brought against state board of education, professional practices advisory
commission, or members of commission or board acting in their official capacities, as those entities are not "persons"
within meaning of§ 1983. 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 1983, 1988. Ambus v. Utah State Bd. of Educ., 1993, 858 P.2d 1372. Civil
Rights~ 1350; Civil Rights ~ 1360
Former teach~r who initially sought both juc;licial review of decision to revoke his teaching certificate and. damages for
violation to constitutional rights was not entitled to attorney fees under § 1983 where it was not until reinstatement
of teaching certificate was ordered by trial court that claimant asserted federal civil rights violations; reinstatement of
certificate was not result of successfully prosecuted civil rights action. 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 1983, 1988. Ambus v. Utah State
Bd. of Educ., 1993, 858 P.2d 1372. Civil Rights F 1482
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["" KeyCite Yellow Flag - Negative Treatment
Enacted LegislationRenumbered by 2018 Utah Laws H.B. 10 (West's No. 18),

West's Utah Code Annotated
Title 53a. State System of Public Education
Chapter 6. Educator Licensing and Professional Practices Act
Part 1. General Provisions '
U.C.A.1953 § 53A-6-102
§ 53A-6-102. Legislative findings on teacher quality--Declaration of education as a profession

Currentness
(l)(a) The Legislature acknowledges that education is perhaps the most important function of state and local
governments, recognizing that the future success of our state and nation depend in large part upon the existence of a
responsible and educated citizenry.

(b) The Legislature further acknowledges that the primary responsibility for the education of children within the state
resides with their parents or guardians and that the role of state and local governments is to support and assist parents
in fulfilling that responsibility.

(2)(a) The Legislature finds that:

(i) quality teaching is the basic building block of successful schools and, outside of home and family circumstances,
the essential component of student achievement;

(ii) the high quality of teachers is absolutely essential to enhance student achievement and to assure educational
excellence in each classroom in the state's public schools; and

(iii) the implementation of a comprehensive continuum of data-driven strategies regarding recruit~ent, preservice,
licensure, induction, professional development, and evaluation is essential if the state and its citizens expect every
classroom to be staffed by a skilled, caring, and effective teacher.

(b) In providing for the safe and effective performance of the function of educating Utah's children, the Legislature
further fmds it to be of critical importance that education, including instruction, administrative, and supervisory
services, be recognized as a profession, and that those who are licensed or seek to become licensed and to ~serve as
educators:

(i) meet high standards both as to qualifications and fitness for service as educators through quality recruitment
and preservice programs before assuming their responsibilities in the schools;
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(ii) maintain those standards in the performance of their duties while holding licenses, in large part through
participating in induction and ongoing professional development programs focused on instructional improvement;

(iii) receive fair, systematic evaluations of their performance at school for the purpose of enhancing the quality of
public education and student achievement; and

(iv) have access to a process for fair examination and review of allegations made against them and for the
administration of appropriate sanctions against those found, in accordance with due process, to have failed to
conduct themselves in a manner commensurate with their authority and responsibility to provide appropriate
professional services to the children of the state.

Credits
Laws 1999, c. 108, § 3, eff. July 1, 1999; Laws 2001, c. 86, § 10, eff. April 30, 2001; Laws 2013, c. 49, § 1, eff. May 14, 2013.

U.C.A. 1953 § 53A-6-102, UT ST§ 53A-6-102
Current through 2017 First Special Session.
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KeyCite Yellow Flag- Negative Treatment
Enacted LegislationRenumbered by 2018 Utah Laws H.B. IO (West's No. 18),

West's Utah Code Annotated
Title 53a. State System of Public Education
Chapter 6. Educator Llcensing and Professional Practices Act
Parts~ Conduct of Educators

U.C.A. 1953 § 53A-6-501
§ 53A-6-501. Board disciplinary action against an educator

Currentness

(l)(a) The board shall direct UPPAC to investigate an allegation, administrative decision, or judicial decision that
evidences an educator is unfit for duty because the educator exhibited behavior that:

(i) is immoral, unprofessional, or incompetent; or

(ii) violates standards of ethical conduct, performance, or professional competence.

(b) If the board determines an allegation or decision described in Subsection (l)(a) does not evidence an educator's
unfitness for duty, the board may dismiss the allegation or decision without an investigation or hearing.

(2) The board shall direct UPPAC to investigate and allow an educator to respond in a UPPAC hearing if the board
receives an allegation that the educator:

(a) was charged with a felony of a sexual nature;

(b) was convicted of a felony of a sexual nature;

(c) pled guilty to a felony of a sexual nature;

(d) entered a plea of no contest to a felony of a sexual nature;

(e) entered a plea in abeyance to a felony of a sexual nature;

(f) was convicted of a sexual offense under Title 76, Chapter 5, Part 4, Sexual Offenses, against a minor child;

(g) engaged in sexually explicit conduct, as defined in Section 76-5b-103, with a student who is a minor; or
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(h) engaged in sexually explicit conduct, as defined in Section 76-5b-103, with a student who is:

(i) not a minor; and

(ii) enrolled in a school where the educator is or was employed.

(3) Upon notice that an educator allegedly violated Section 53A-6-502, the board shall direct UPPAC to:

(a) investigate the alleged violation; and
~

(b) hold a hearing to allow the educator to respond to the allegation.

(4) Upon completion of an investigation or hearing described in this section, UPPAC shall:

(a) provide fmdings to the board; and

(b) make a recommendation for board action.

(5)(a) Except as provided in Subsection (5)(b), upon review ofUPPAC's fmdings and recommendation, the board may:

(i) revoke the educator's license;

(ii) suspend the educator's license;

(iii) restrict or prohibit the educator from renewing the educato·r•s license;

(iv) warn or reprimand the educator;

(v) enter into a written agreement with the educator that requires the educator to comply with certain conditions;

(vi) direct UPPAC to further investigate or gather information; or

(vii) take other action the board finds to be appropriate for and consistent with the educator's behavior.

(b) Upon review of UPPA C's fmdings and recommendation, the board shall revoke the license of an educator who:
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(i) was convicted of a felony of a sexual nature;

(ii) pied guilty to a felony of a sexual nature;

(iii) entered a plea of no contest to a felony of a sexual nature;

(iv) entered a plea in abeyance to a felony of a sexual nature;

(v) was convicted of a sexual offense under Title 76, Chapter 5, Part 4, Sexual Offenses, against a minor child;

(vi) engaged in sexually explicit conduct, as defined in Section 76-5b-103, with a student who is a minor;

(vii) engaged in sexually explicit conduct, as defined in Section 76-5b-103, with a student who is:

(A) not a minor; and

(B) enrolled in a school where the educator is or was employed; or

(viii) admits to the board or UPPAC that the applicant committed conduct that amounts to:

(A) a felony of a sexual nature; or

(B) a sexual offense or sexually explicit conduct described in Subsection (5)(b)(v), (vi), or (vii).

(c) The board may not reinstate a revoked license.

(d) Before the board takes adverse action against an educator under this section, the board shall ensure that the
educator had an opportunity for a UPPAC hearing.

Credits
Laws 1999, c. 108, § 23, eff. July 1, 1999; Laws 2008, c. 189, § 1, eff. May 5, 2008; Laws 2008, c. 190, § 1, eff. May 5, 2008;
Laws 2011, c. 320, § 3, eff. May 10, 2011; Laws 2015, c. 311, § 5, eff. July 1, 2015.

Notes of Decisions (5)
U.C.A. 1953 § 53A-6-501, UT ST§ 53A-6-501
Current through 2017 First Special Session.
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